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Abstract
We deviate from the symmetric case of the independent private value
model by allowing the bidders’ value distributions, which depend on pa-
rameters, to be slightly diﬀerent. We show that previous results about
the equality to the ﬁrst-order in the parameters between revenues from the
second-price auction and other auction mechanisms follow from the joint dif-
ferentiability of the equilibria with respect to the parameters. We prove this
diﬀerentiability for the ﬁrst-price auction and obtain general formulas for the
diﬀerent ﬁrst-order eﬀects. From our results about the ﬁrst-price auction,
we analytically generate examples with continuous distributions where a sto-
chastic improvement to a bidder’s value distribution reduces his equilibrium
payoﬀ. In another application, we show that, starting from competition
among cartels of equal sizes, allowing in a small number of members from
other cartels can be proﬁtable only if the members or the synergies between
them are strong enough.
11. Introduction
Starting from the standard independent private value model with ho-
mogeneous bidders, Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2004) consider a particular
asymmetric perturbation of the valuation distributions. They show heuris-
tically that the revenues from the second-price auction and from some other
auctions, if equal with homogeneous bidders, are equal to the ﬁrst-order in
the size of their asymmetric perturbation. By increasing the dimensionality
of the parameters that determine the perturbations, we show that Fibich et
al. (2004)’s result is an immediate consequence of the joint diﬀerentiability
with respect to these asymmetry parameters. We then go on to prove this
diﬀerentiability for the ﬁrst-price auction and for general asymmetric pertur-
bations of the valuation distributions1.F o r m u l a s f o r t h e ﬁrst-order eﬀects on
all equilibrium functions and quantities of interest can then be easily derived
and extend the expressions Fibich and Gavious (2003) compute.
We next show two applications, pertaining to the ﬁrst-price auction, of
our results. In the ﬁrst application, we analitically generate, from our explicit
formulas for the ﬁrst-order eﬀects, a class of examples where the stronger a
bidder is, the smaller his exante payoﬀ becomes. Arozamena and Cantil-
lon (2004) check numerically that an example they construct satisﬁes this
property. The existence of continuous examples with this property already
followed from the discrete examples Thomas (1997) found analytically and
the continuity of the equilibrium with respect to the value distributions (see
Lebrun 2002).
In the second application, we consider the formation of coalitions. We
show that, starting from competing homogeneous cartels, allowing a small
number of transfers from other cartels is proﬁtable to a cartel only if the
bidders or the synergies between them are strong enough. A result from
1Contrary to what Fibich et al. (2004) write in their footnote 4, Lebrun (1996, 1999)
does not prove the diﬀerentiability with respect to the parameters.
2Waehrer (1999) that compares the players’ expected payoﬀs within the same
equilibrium, combined with our diﬀerentiability result, implies that letting
in a small number of weak bidders cannot increase the average payoﬀ in the
absence of signiﬁcant synergies. Our explicit formulas show that the average
payoﬀ actually decreases in this case.
2. First-Order Revenue Equivalence
Consider the standard independent private value model with n risk-neutral
bidders whose values are distributed over the same interval [c,d].T h e v a l u e















where m is a strictly positive integer, ρ>0,a n d(τi
1,...,τi
m) is the vector
τi of parameters speciﬁct ob i d d e ri, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Throughout the
paper, F (.;τi
1,...,τi
m) is a continuous-from-the-right cumulative distribution
function with support [c,d] and such that its restriction to [c,d] is absolutely
continuous, for all values of the parameters τi
1,...,τi
m.2
Let RS (τ1,...,τn) be the auctioneer’s expected revenues from the equi-
librium in weakly dominant strategy—the sincere-bidding equilibrium—of the
second-price auction when bidder i’s vector of parameters is τi, for all i.
In this case, we also denote RM (τ1,...,τn) the expected revenues from an
incentive compatible and individually rational direct mechanism M.T h e
following proposition is an simple mathematical exercise. In its statement as
in the rest of the paper, a bold character denotes a nm-dimensional vector.






to be atomless, in the appendices
we will sometimes allow a mass point at c.




, for all permutation π of {1,2,...,n}. Assume further that
the revenues RM and RS coincide when the values are distributed identically,
that is, RM (τ,...,τ)=RS (τ,...,τ),f o ra l lτ in (−ρ,ρ)
m.T h e n ,i fRM and
RS are diﬀerentiable at 0,w h e r e0 is the null nm-dimensional vector, whose
all components are equal to 0,w eh a v e( i )a n d( i i )b e l o w :










∈ Rnm diﬀerent from the null vector, the deriva-










Proof: See Appendix 1.
If the direct mechanism M is constructed from equilibrium strategies of
some auction procedure, the revenue function RM is symmetric when the
auction’s rules are anonymous and the equilibrium unique for all n-tuples of
distributions (F (.;τ1),...,F (.;τn)) with (τ1,...,τn) in (−ρ,ρ)
nm.F r o m t h e
Revenue Equivalence Theorem (see Myerson, 1981), the functions RM and
RS coincide for identical value distributions if, in those cases, M allocates
the item to the highest value bidder and leaves no payoﬀ to any bidder with
value c.3
To illustrate Proposition 1 and its proof, consider the case with two bid-
ders and one-dimensional parameters, that is, n =2and m =1 .B y
assumption, the mechanism M and the second-price auction give the same
revenues when both bidders’ values are distributed according to F (.;τ),t h a t
3For example, in Fibich et al (2004)’s auctions: anonimity comes from the explicit
assumption that the winner be the highest bidder; eﬃcient allocation in the symmetric
case and uniqueness are implictly assumed; and zero payoﬀ to the bidder with the lowest
possible value is explictly assumed.
4is, when the couple of parameters (τ1,τ2) is equal to (τ,τ) and hence belongs
to the diagonal D (see Figure 1). Consequently, the derivatives of RM and
RS at (0,0) in the direction (1,1) along this diagonal are identical.
FIGURE 1
The derivative of RS at (0,0) in the direction (1,−1) is equal to zero.
If it was strictly positive, for example, there would exist a small λ>0
such that RS (λ,−λ) would be strictly larger than RS (−λ,λ).H o w e v e r ,
this is impossible since the revenues from the second-price auction when the
couple of value distributions is (F (.;λ),F(.;−λ)) are the same as when the
distribution couple is (F (.;−λ),F(.;λ)),f o ra l lλ. Only the labeling of the
bidders diﬀers, with no eﬀect on the total revenues.
The assumed symmetry of RM implies similarly that the derivative of
RM in the direction (1,−1) is equal to zero. Consequently, all direc-
tional derivatives for RM and RS are identical. Moreover, the diﬀerence
between RM (τ1,τ2) and RS (τ1,τ2) vanishes at (τ1,τ2)=( 0 ,0).T h u s ,
from the assumption of diﬀerentiability, this diﬀerence is equal to zero to
the ﬁrst-order in the distance between (τ1,τ2) and (0,0),t h a ti s ,t h er a t i o
|RM(τ1,τ2)−RS(τ1,τ2)|
|(τ1,τ2)| tends towards zero as the length |(τ1,τ2)| of the vector
(τ1,τ2) tends towards zero. Proposition 1 (i) follows.
Since the derivative of RM in the direction orthogonal to D vanishes,





is equal to its derivative along the
orthogonal projection δ1+δ2


















In the next section, we show conditions under which Proposition 1 may
be applied to the case where M is the equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction
a n dp r o v et h a tt h ee x a m p l e sb e l o wc a nb em a d et os a t i s f yt h e s ec o n d i t i o n s .
5Example 1: Consider Fibich et al (2004)’s asymmetric perturbations:
Fi (.)=F (.)+εHi (.),( 2 )
where F is an absolutely continuous cumulative distribution function4.T h e i r



















n, Hk is continuous and such that Hk (c)=Hk (d)=






¯ ¯ exists and is strictly positive
over (c,d]. The departure (2) from the symmetric model is then the par-










,w i t hδ
i
j =0if j 6= i and
δ
i
i =1(here, in the notation of Proposition 1, m = n).
From Proposition 1 (ii), assuming diﬀerentiability, the derivative of RM















where e is the n-dimensional vector with all its components equal to 1.
When the vector of parameters is ε/n(e,...,e), every distribution function
Fi in (3) is G(.;ε)=F (.)+ε
Pn
k=1 Hk (.)/n, whose derivative with respect to
ε is equal to
Pn





n−1 − (n − 1)G(.;ε)
nª
dv
for the revenues from the second-price auction in the symmetric case, the
derivative with respect to ε at ε =0gives5 the following value for the direc-
4Fibich et al (2004) actually assume that F is continuously diﬀerentiable, and that
|Hi| ≤ 1 and Hi (c)=Hi (d)=0 , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Obviously, we must, as we do below,
add conditions to make sure that F1,...,F n are probability distributions.
5In Section 3, we return to Example 1 and show (by appealing to Proposition 2, Section
3) that we may diﬀerentiate under the integral sign.












the ﬁrst-order eﬀect found by Fibich et al (2004).
Example 2: In Section 4 especially, we will use the following departures



















m, Hk is strictly positive and bounded over (c,d],
and such that Hk (d)=1 , for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m,a n d d






exists and is strictly positive over (c,d].W h e n m = n, the derivative of the





as in Example 1 above, which
gives the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of the deviation Fi = FHε












3 . T h eS e c o n d - P r i c ea n dt h eF i r s t - P r i c eA u c t i o n s
From the simplicity of the sincere-bidding equilibrium of the second-price
auction, conditions under which RS is diﬀerentiable are easily obtained. We
have Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2: Assume there exists 0 <ρ 0 <ρsuch that the distribu-
tion function (1) is absolutely continuous in v everywhere and continuously
6In Section 3, we also return to Example 2 and prove (from Proposition 2, Section 3)
that diﬀerentiation may be taken under the integral sign.
7diﬀerentiable with respect to τ in (−ρ0,ρ 0)
m and its partial derivatives with
respect to τ1,...,τm are bounded over (c,d)×(−ρ0,ρ 0)
m.T h e n , RS is contin-
uously diﬀerentiable over (−ρ0,ρ 0)
m and diﬀerentiation may be taken under




























Proof: For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ m,s i n c e ∂
∂τkF (v;τ) and F (v;τ)
are bounded, when we diﬀerentiate the equality above with respect to τi
k,
we may diﬀerentiate under the integral signs (for example, from Lebesgue



















































RS (τ1,...,τn) is continuous. Proposition 2 follows. ||
From the previous section, if the equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction is
unique and diﬀerentiable with respect to the perturbation parameters, the
equality to the ﬁrst-order between the revenues from the ﬁrst and second-
price auctions immediately follows from the Revenue-Equivalence Theorem.
From Lebrun (1999), under Assumption E below, any equilibrium is pure
and satisﬁes a system of diﬀerential equations, obtained from the ﬁrst-order
conditions, with partially determined boundary conditions. From Lebrun
(2006), Assumption U is an example of assumptions under which the equi-
librium is unique. It requires that the value distributions’ inverse hazard
8rates be strictly decreasing over an interval, however small, in the bottom of
the valuation interval7. In Appendix 3, we prove many of our results under
more general assumptions that allow a mass point at c, as in the presence of
a binding reserve price (in which case, we may assume that the probability
spread below the reserve price is rather concentrated at it.)
Assumption E: F (.;τ) is atomless and is diﬀerentiable—with respect
to v—over (c,d] and its derivative8—the density function f (.;τ)—is locally
bounded away from zero over this interval, for all τ in (−ρ,ρ)
m.
Assumption U:F o r a l l τ in (−ρ,ρ)
m,t h e r ee x i s t sπ>0,w h i c hm a y
depend on τ, such that F (.;τ) is strictly log-concave over (c,c + π).
As we show below, the diﬀerentiability of the equilibrium of the ﬁrst-
price auction and of RF with respect to the perturbation parameters follows
from Assumption D below. Since Assumption D immediately implies the
assumptions of Proposition 2, RS too is diﬀerentiable under D and the ﬁrst-
order equality between RS and RF follows from Proposition 1 (Section 2).
Assumption D:
(i) F (v;τ) can be extended beyond v = d such that it is continuously
diﬀerentiable—with respect to (v;τ)—and ∂
∂vF (v;τ) is strictly positive over an
open set (c,d + ζ) × (−ρ,ρ)
m,w h e r eζ>0.
( i i ) T h e r ee x i s t sa ni n t e g r a b l ef u n c t i o nI (v) such that ∂
∂vF (v;τ) ≤
I (v) over (c,d)×(−ρ0,ρ 0)
m,w h e r eρ0 is a strictly positive number not larger
than ρ.
(iii) For all 1 ≤ k ≤ m, ∂
∂τkF (v;τ) is bounded over (c,d)×(−ρ00,ρ 00)
m,
where ρ00 is a strictly positive number not larger than ρ.
7In Appendix 3, we refer to another uniqueness result from Lebrun (2006). Other
uniqueness results can be found in Corollary 4 in Lebrun (1999), Theorem 1 in Lebrun
(2006), and Appendix 6 in Lebrun (2004).
8The derivative at v = d is a lefthand derivative.
9When the partial derivatives ∂
∂vF (v;τ)=f (v;τ) and ∂
∂τlF (v;τ), 1 ≤
l ≤ m, are continuous over (c,d] × (−ρ,ρ)
m, f (v;τ) is strictly positive over
t h es a m es e t ,a n df (d;τ) is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to τ in
(−ρ,ρ)
m,e x t e n d i n gF according to the equality F (v;τ)=1 + f (d;τ)(v − d),
for all v in (d,d + ζ),s a t i s ﬁes D (i).
We now ﬁnd when the examples from the previous section satisfy the
assumptions above.
Example 1: Example 1 (Section 2) satisﬁes Assumption E if F and
H1,...,Hm are diﬀerentiable over (c,d] with respective derivatives f,h1,..,h n
such that f − ρ
Pm
k=1 |hk| is locally bounded away from zero. From our
remark after the statement of Assumption D, it satisﬁes D(i) under the same
conditions.
Decreasing ρ if necessary, it satisﬁes Assumption U if, for example, over
an interval [c,c + ε],w h e r eε>0, d
dvf, d
dvh1,..., d
dvhm exist and are continuous
and F (v) d
dvf (v) − f (v)
2 has a strictly negative maximum.








k=1 |hk|,w h i c h
is integrable since f and hk, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, are, and D (ii) is satisﬁed.
Example 2: Example 2 (Section 2) satisﬁes Assumptions E and D (i) if F
and H1,...,Hm are diﬀerentiable over (c,d] with derivatives f,h1,...,hm such
that f/F−ρ
Pm







are strictly log-concave in an interval (c,c + ε),w h e r e
ε>0,i ts a t i s ﬁes Assumption U.
We now show that D (ii) and D (iii) are satisﬁed if H1,...,Hm are bounded.













. Since the expression between






¯ ¯ and thus9 than 2 d
dv lnF,




τk. Consequently, D (ii)




τk,f o rv in [c,d] and (τ1,...,τm) in [−ρ/2,ρ/2]
m.
For all 1 ≤ l ≤ m and all (v;τ1,...,τm) in (c,d]×(−ρ/2,ρ/2)
m, the deriva-






















From the properties of the logarithm, the ﬁrst factor above is bounded. Since
the second factor is a cumulative distribution function, it is also bounded.
Example 2 thus satisﬁes D (iii) with ρ00 = ρ/2.
Theorem 1 below is the main result of this section.
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions E, U, and D be satisﬁed. Then:
(i) For all τ =( τ1,...,τn) in (−ρ,ρ)
nm, there exists one and only
one equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction with n-tuple of value distributions
(F (.;τ1),...,F (.;τn)).
(ii) For all v in (c,d] and 1 ≤ i ≤ n,b i d d e ri’s equilibrium bid βi (v;τ),
interim expected payoﬀ Pi (v;τ), and ex-ante expected payoﬀ Pi (τ) are dif-
ferentiable with respect to τ at τ = 0 and the values of the partial derivatives
with respect to the parameters are as in Appendix 2.
(iii) For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the auctioneer’s revenues RF (τ) and RS (τ) are
diﬀerentiable and equal to the ﬁrst-order at τ = 0.
9Because d





¯ ¯ ≥ 0.
11Proof: See Appendix 3.
We brieﬂy outline the proof of Theorem 1. Consider the three-bidder
case. For all vector of parameters τ =( τ1,τ2,τ3), the bid functions
β1 (.;τ),β2 (.;τ),β3 (.;τ) form the unique equilibrium if and only if there
exists c<η<dsuch that their inverses α1 (.;τ),α 2 (.;τ),α 3 (.;τ) satisfy








α1 (b;τ) − b
+
1
α2 (b;τ) − b
+
1










α1 (b;τ) − b
−
1
α2 (b;τ) − b
+
1










α1 (b;τ) − b
+
1
α2 (b;τ) − b
−
1
α3 (b;τ) − b
¾
;( 7 )
α1 (c;τ)=α2 (c;τ)=α3 (c;τ)=c;( 8 )
α1 (η;τ)=α2 (η;τ)=α3 (η;τ)=d.( 9 )
η in (9) is the common maximum of the equilibrium bid functions.
Once the diﬀerentiability with respect to the bid is established (see Lebrun
1999), the equations (5-7) follow immediately from the ﬁrst-order conditions.
For example, the ﬁrst-order condition of bidder 1’s maximization problem
maxb (v1 − b)F (α2 (b;τ);τ2)F (α3 (b;τ);τ3) when v1 = α1 (b) gives (10) be-



























α3 (b) − b
.(12)
Adding up (11) and (12) and subtracting (10), we ﬁnd (5). The other
equations are obtained similarly.
12We cannot apply the standard theorems regarding the diﬀerentiability
with respect to parameters of the solution of a diﬀerential system with initial
condition to (5-7) and (8) because the Lipschitz condition does not hold true
at (8), where the denominators in (5-7) vanish. However, it does at (9). If
we knew the exact value of η as a function of the parameters, we could infer
its diﬀerentiability and then apply the standard theorems. Unfortunately, all
we know is that it is uniquely determined. We now show how to circumvent
this diﬃculty.
From Lemma A2-2 in Lebrun (1997) or Lemma A1-1 in Lebrun (2006),
the derivatives in (5-7) are strictly positive. By multiplying the system (5-7)










1 (q;τ1)−γ1(q;τ) + 1
F
−1












1 (q;τ1)−γ1(q;τ) − 1
F−1





1 (q;τ1)−γ1(q;τ) + 1
F−1











1 (q;τ1)−γ1(q;τ) + 1
F−1






1 (q;τ1)−γ1(q;τ) + 1
F
−1












and λ21,λ 31 are the functions that link bidder
1’s value quantile with bidders 2 and 3’s value quantiles at which they submit














The initial condition (9) is then equivalent to the set of equalities (16) and
(17) below:
γ1 (1;τ)=η,( 1 6 )
λ21 (1;τ)=λ31 (1;τ)=1 .( 1 7 )
10Working with quantiles as the variables avoids imposing Lipschitz conditions on the
density functions.
13The part (17) of the initial conditions regarding the functions λ21 and λ31 is
now independent of the parameters.
Consider, for example, the function λ21. Since the initial condition (17)
does not depend on τ, its derivative with respect to any combination of
the parameters vanishes. Moreover, if we diﬀerentiate the equation (14)
for d
dqλ21 (q;τ) with respect to the parameters and use the diﬀerentiability
with respect to (q,τi), which Assumption D (i) implies, of F−1 (q,τi),t h e
functions γ1 (q;τ) and λ31 (q;τ) disappear. In fact, these functions enter
the same way the numerator and denominator of the R.H.S.’s ratio, which
equals one for any symmetric case and, in particular, for τ = 0.
Although no general explicit expression exists for the maximum bid η,
explicit bounds (see Lemma A3-2, Appendix 3) can be obtained from Le-
brun (1997, 1999). These bounds and Assumption D (iii) guarantee that
the diﬀerence ratio in the computation of the derivative of η in the initial
condition (16) stays bounded, thereby entitling us to diﬀe r e n t i a t e( 1 4 )w i t h
respect to the parameters. We thus obtain and uniquely solve a completely
determined diﬀerential equation with initial condition where the derivative
at τ = 0 of λ21 (q;τ) with respect to the parameters is the only unknown
function.
In Appendix 3, we actually prove in general the joint diﬀerentiability of
the functions such as λ21,λ 31 with respect to the vector τ of parameters and
the bid b. This joint diﬀerentiability and the deﬁnition of these functions
imply the diﬀerentiability with respect to the parameters of bidder 1’s in-
terim probability of winning—the product of F2 (α2 (β1 (v1;τ);τ);τ2) with
F3 (α3 (β1 (v1;τ);τ);τ3).T h e d i ﬀerentiability of bidder 1’s bid β1 (v1;τ)
then comes from the envelope theorem, which links it to bidder 1’s probabil-
ity of winning. Thanks to Assumption D (ii), taking the expectation of the
winner’s bid gives expected revenues that are also diﬀerentiable with respect
to the parameters.
4. Further Applications
14In Section 2, we showed how our diﬀerentiability results imply properties
of auction revenues. Here, we show two examples of applications that pertain
to stochastic shifts of the value distributions in the ﬁrst-price auction. The
function F (v;τ) depends on a one-dimensional parameter τ in (−ρ,ρ) such
that, for all τ0 >τ , F (v;τ0) strictly dominates F (v;τ) in the sense of the
conditional stochastic dominance, that is, the reverse hazard rate of F (v;τ0)
is larger than F (v;τ)’s or, equivalently, d
dv lnF (v;τ0) > d
dv lnF (v;τ).I t i m -
plies that the ratio
F(v;τ0)
F(v;τ) is strictly increasing. Bidder i becomes “stronger”
in this sense by, in the ﬁrst application below, engaging in value enhancing
investments and, in the second application, allowing more members in his
cartel.
4.1 Application 1
In the models we consider in this application and the next, the cross
second-order derivatives ∂2
∂v∂τ lnF (v;0)and ∂2
∂τ∂v lnF (v;0)e x i s ta n da r ee q u a l .
Since, from our assumption of stochastic dominance, ∂2
∂τ∂v lnF (v;0)is non-
negative, all the formulas we obtain from the previous section for the ﬁrst-
order eﬀects (see Appendix 2) are consistent (as they should!) with the exist-
ing literature. For example, we have ∂
∂τjβi (v;0) ≥ 0, ∂
∂τjF (αj (b;0);0)≤ 0,
∂
∂τjPi (v;0) ≤ ∂
∂τjPj (v;0) ≤ 0, which are consistent with the increase of bid-
der i’s bid function, the stochastic increase of bidder j’s bid distribution,
and the decrease of the bidders’ interim expected payoﬀs Lebrun (1998)11
describes as consequences of a stochastic increase of bidder j’s value distrib-
ution12. Since bidder j’s value is more likely to be high, his exante expected
11Lebrun (1998) proves these results under the assumption that the bidders can be
divided into two groups, such that the value distributions of the bidders within a group
are identical. By constructing a counterexample, Lebrun (2002, Proposition 1) shows
that these results cannot be extended to asymmetric settings with more than two groups
of bidders.
12These inequalities are also consistent with some properties in Corollary 3 of Lebrun
15payoﬀ may improve, despite the other bidders’ more aggressive bidding. Nev-
ertheless, it may not. Indeed, Thomas (1997) provides a discrete analytical
example where bidder j’s exante expected payoﬀ actually decreases after a
stochastic improvement of his value distribution. Through numerical com-
putations, Arozamena and Cantillon (2004) provide an example with interval
supports where, after becoming stronger, bidder j also sees his expected pay-
oﬀ go down. Here, thanks to our explicit formulas for the ﬁrst-order eﬀects,
it is simple to analytically generate examples where ∂
∂τjPj (0) < 0.M o r e -
over, as we state in Corollary 1 below, such examples may be constructed
as stochastic changes of any diﬀerentiable absolutely continuous distribution
whose density does not go to inﬁnity too fast at c.
Corollary 113:
(i) Let F (v;τ) in (1) satisfy Assumptions E,U, and D with m =1 .
Let also F (v;τ) be strictly increasing in τ for the conditional stochastic
dominance and let ∂2
∂v∂τ lnF (v;0)and ∂2
∂τ∂v lnF (v;0)exist and be equal, for







lnF (v;0)dv < 0,( 1 8 )




F(v;0)n−1 f (v), for all v in (c,d],t h e n
we have ∂
∂τiPi (0) < 0,f o ra l l1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(ii) Let F be an absolutely continuous cumulative distribution function
that is diﬀerentiable with a derivative f locally bounded away from zero over
(1999) according to which, within any equilibrium: a bidder bids higher than another
bidder whose value distribution his distribution conditionally dominates (for the two-
bidder case, see also Proposition 3.3 in Maskin and Riley, 2000); and the same ﬁrst-order
relation of stochastic dominance holds true between bidders’ bid distributions as between
their value distributions. See Application 2 below for another example of a link between
ﬁrst-order comparative statics and previously known properties of strategies within the
same equilibrium.
13We prove in Appendix 4 the more general Corollary 1’, which allows c to be a mass
point.
16(c,d] and such that F is strictly log-concave over an interval (c,c + ε), with
ε>0,a n d(v − c)f (v) tends towards zero as v tends towards c.
Then, there exists F (v;τ) that satisﬁes Assumptions E,U,D, is increasing
in τ for the conditional stochastic dominance, and is such that F (v;0) =
F (v) and ∂
∂τiPi (0) < 0,f o ra l l1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof: See Appendix 4.
For example, from Corollary 1, there exist stochastic improvements of
a bidder’s uniform value distribution F (v)=v over [0,1] that make him
worse oﬀ in the ﬁrst-price auction. From the construction in the proof of
Corollary 1, the function F (v;τ)=vexp
n
−τ (1 − v)
θ
o
,w h e r eθ>4,d e -
scribes such improvements. Starting from the uniform symmetric model,
because of the indirect strategic eﬀect through the change of the other bid-
ders’ equilibrium strategies, bidder i would not improve his value distribution
to vexp
n
−τ (1 − v)
θ
o
,f o ras m a l lp o s i t i v eτ, even if he could do so at no
direct cost.
4.2 Application 2
In this application, F (v;τ) is the value distribution of a cartel of 1+τ
bidders. When bidders do not exert any positive or negative eﬀect on their
fellow cartel members, F (v;τ) is simply the distribution of the maximum of
the members’ values, that is, when the values are independently and identi-
cally distributed according to F (v;0): F (v;τ)=F (v;0)
1+τ, ∂ ln
∂v F (v;τ)=
(1 + τ) ∂ ln
∂v F (v;0),a n d
(∂ ln)2
∂τ∂v F (v;τ)=1 . For all k>0, F (v;0)
1+τ can as
well be interpreted as the value distribution of a cartel that counts k/τ + k
members, each with the value distribution F (v;0)
τ/k. Waehrer (1997) proves
that, in any equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction among such cartels, a cartel
has a smaller per-member average payoﬀ than any smaller cartel.
17Since Example 2 in Sections 2 and 3 encompasses this model, the equilib-
rium is diﬀerentiable around the symmetric case—of equal-size cartels—when
Assumptions E,U, and D are satisﬁed. Assume this is the case. Then, the
derivative ∂
∂τiAPi (0) of cartel i’s average payoﬀ with respect to τi,o rw i t hr e -
spect to its size 1+τi, must not exceed its derivative ∂
∂τjAPi (0) with respect
to τj, for all j 6= i,t h a ti s , ∂
∂τiAPi (0) ≤ ∂
∂τjAPi (0). Otherwise, after a trans-
fer of dτ bidders from cartel j to cartel i,c a r t e li’s average payoﬀ would be
larger than cartel j’s by an amount equal to
¡
∂




0, which would contradict Waehrer (1999)’s result. Here, from our explicit
formulas for the partial derivatives, we prove Corollary 2 below, according
to which the strict inequality ∂
∂τiAPi (0) < ∂
∂τjAPi (0) actually holds.
Transfers of bidders into a cartel have one obvious detrimental direct ef-
fect on the cartel’s average payoﬀ—the increase of the number of members—and
two beneﬁcial direct eﬀects—the stochastic increase of its value distribution
and the stochastic decrease of its competitors’ value distributions. An addi-
tional detrimental strategic or indirect eﬀect is also present: the other cartels
bid more aggressively. From Corollary 2 below, the detrimental eﬀects out-
weigh the beneﬁcial ones and cause the expanding cartel’s average payoﬀ to
decrease.
When, because of diseconomies of scale in the cartel size, F (v;0)
1+τ dom-
inates F (v;τ) for τ>0,w eh a v e
(∂ ln)2
∂τ∂v F (v;0)≤ 1. This new adverse direct
eﬀect contribute, by slowing the increase of the expanding cartel’s value
distribution and the decrease of the competing shrinking cartels’ value dis-
tributions, to make accepting transfers unattractive14. We have Corollary 2
below: this intuition is correct.
Corollary 215: Let F (v;τ) in (1) satisfy Assumptions E,U, and D with
14It is straightforward to extend Waehrer (1999)’s result, which compares average payoﬀs
within the same equilibrium, from the assumption
(∂ ln)2
∂τ∂v F (v;τ)=1to the assumption
(∂ ln)2
∂τ∂v F (v;τ) ≤ 1, for all (v;τ).
15In Appendix 4, we prove Corollary 2’, which, since it allows c to be a mass point, is
more general than Corollary 2.
18m =1and ρ<1.L e t F (v;τ) be strictly increasing in τ for the conditional
stochastic dominance and let ∂2
∂v∂τ lnF (v;0)and ∂2
∂τ∂v lnF (v;0)exist and be




for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and τ in (−ρ,ρ)
n.T h e n , i f
(∂ ln)2
∂τ∂v F (v;0)≤ 1,f o ra l lv





for all i 6= j. Moreover, if there exists ε>0 such that
(∂ ln)2
∂τ∂v F (v;0)> 0,
for all v in (d − ε,d), the inequality in (19) is strict.
Proof: See Appendix 4.
Thus, in the ﬁrst-price auction, admitting transfers into a cartel can only
make sense when the additional bidders are numerous or strong enough, that
is, dτ is large enough, or when there are strong enough synergies, that is,
(∂ ln)2
∂τ∂v F (v;0) is large enough. To illustrate this point, assume that, in the
case
(∂ ln)2
∂τ∂v F (v;τ)=1without synergies, two cartels of ﬁve bidders each form
out of 10 bidders whose values are identically distributed over [0,1] according
to F (v)=v1/2. From the standard formulas for the symmetric case, one
can easily compute that the per-member average payoﬀ of each cartel is
0.0238. From the numerical estimations16 in Marshall, Meurer, Richard,
and Stromquist (1994), if only one bidder is transferred from one cartel to
the other, the average payoﬀ of the cartel with the new bidder drops to 0.0233
(while the average payoﬀ of the other cartel jumps to 0.0261). However, if
two more bidders are transferred, the average payoﬀ of the larger cartel, now
16Marshall et al (1994) actually consider a total of ﬁve bidders with uniformly distributed
values. The ﬁgures for our 6-4 and 8-2 splits come from their ﬁgures for the 3-2 and 4-1
splits.
19counting eight members, becomes 0.0283.
5. Conclusion
We showed that, under joint diﬀerentiability of the equilibrium with re-
spect to the parameters, the equality in the symmetric case between the
revenues of two anonymous auction mechanisms is to the ﬁrst-order in the
asymmetry parameters. We proved this diﬀerentiability for the second-price
and ﬁrst-price auctions. For the ﬁrst-price auction, we obtained general for-
mulas for the ﬁrst-order eﬀects of a change of parameters on the equilibrium
bids and payoﬀs. As examples of other applications, we showed how to
analytically generate continuous cases where shifting a bidder’s distribution
t o w a r d sh i g h e rv a l u e sl o w e r sh i sp a y o ﬀ, and we proved that, without strong
synergies, it is unproﬁtable for a cartel to become slightly larger than its
competitors through transfers of members.
Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1 (Section 2):L e t D be the m-dimensional
linear space spanned by the vectors (τ1,...,τn) such that τi = τj, for all
1 ≤ i,j ≤ n.L e t D⊥ be its orthogonal complement. By deﬁnition, the
dimension of D⊥ is nm −m =( n − 1)m and we have Rnm = D ⊕D⊥.T h e
space D⊥ is the set of vectors (τ1,...,τn) such that
Pn
i=1 τi =0 .I t i s e q u a l
to the direct sum ⊕m
l=2Vl,w h e r eVl is the m-dimensional space spanned by
the vectors (τ1,...,τn) such that τk =0 ,f o ra l lk 6=1 ,l,a n dτl = −τ1.
Let N be equal to M or S.L e t dRN (0) be the diﬀerential of RN at
0, considered as a linear function from Rnm to R.L e t l between 2 and n
and let τ be an element of Vl.I f t h e d e r i v a t i v e o f RN at 0 in the direction
of τ was diﬀerent from zero, the values RN (λτ) and RN (−λτ) would be
diﬀerent, for all number λ close enough to zero. However, this is impossible,
since λτ and −λτ are equal up to a permutation of their n components and
RN is symmetric. Consequently, dRN (0) vanishes over D⊥.





is thus equal to










over D. Since, by assumption, RM and RS coincide over D,
it is also equal to the derivative of RS in the same direction. Proposition 1 (ii)



























is orthogonal to any vector (τ,...,τ) in D.
Let ∆(τ) be the diﬀerence RM (τ) − RS (τ) and let d∆(0) be its diﬀer-
ential at 0.S i n c e , d∆(0) is equal to dRM (0)−dRS (0), it also vanishes over
D⊥. By assumption, ∆ vanishes over D and hence so does its diﬀerential
d∆(0). W eh a v ep r o v e dt h a tt h ed i ﬀerential d∆(0) vanishes everywhere
over Rnm. Proposition 1 (i) follows. ||
Appendix 2
The formulas in 2., 3., 4. below hold true if ∂
∂τlF (v;0) is diﬀerentiable
with respect to v in (c,d],f o ra l l1 ≤ l ≤ m,a n di n5 . ,6 .i f ∂2
∂v∂τl lnF (v;0)and
∂2
∂τl∂v lnF (v;0)exist and are equal. Without these additional assumptions,
the formulas are less compact.






























λji(q;0)=0 ,f o ra l lh 6= i,j.





























ϕji(v;0)=0 ,f o ra l lh 6= i,j.













































































,w h e r eδ
j
k =0if k 6= j
and δ
k







βi (v;0). Substituting in this expression the formulas below,
applied to Example 1 (Section 2), easily gives (after some rearranging and one integration
by parts) the ﬁrst-order eﬀect that Fibich and Gavious (2003) ﬁnd the perturbations (3)
have on the bid functions.






















































































































































































Throughout Appendices 3 and 4, we maintain the assumption from the
main text that F (.;τ) ((1), Section 2) be absolutely continuous over [c,d].
Assumption EU’ below pertains to the case of a mass point at c.I t
is satisﬁed by Example 1 (Section 2) if F (c) − ρ
Pm
k=1 |Hk (c)| > 0 and by
Example 2 (Section 2) if F (c),H 1 (c),...,Hm (c) > 0.
Assumption EU’: F (.;τ) has a mass point at c and is diﬀerentiable—
with respect to v—over [c,d] with a derivative18—the density function f (.;τ)—
that is bounded away from zero over this interval, for all τ in (−ρ,ρ)
m.
18The derivative at c is a righthand derivative.
24In this appendix, we prove Theorem 1’ below, which extends Theorem 1
(Section 3)19.
Theorem 1’:
(i) Let either Assumptions E and U or Assumption EU’ be satisﬁed.
Then, for all τ =( τ1,...,τn) in (−ρ,ρ)
nm, there exists one and only one equi-
librium of the ﬁrst-price auction with n-tuple of value distributions (F (.;τ1),...,F(.;τn)).
(ii) Let either Assumptions E and U or Assumption EU’ be satisﬁed.
Let also Assumptions D (i) and (iii) be satisﬁed. Then, for all v in (c,d]
and 1 ≤ i ≤ n,b i d d e ri’s equilibrium bid βi (v;τ), interim expected payoﬀ
Pi (v;τ), and exante expected payoﬀ Pi (τ) are diﬀerentiable with respect
to τ at τ = 0 and the values of the partial derivatives with respect to the
parameters are as in Appendix 2.
(iii) Let Assumptions E, U, and D be satisﬁed. Then, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
the auctioneer’s revenues RF (τ) and RS (τ) are diﬀerentiable and equal to
the ﬁrst-order at τ = 0.
We divide the proof of Theorem 1’ into several lemmas. First, we have
19Further generalizations are possible. For example, Theorem 1 (i) and (ii) can be
proved under Assumption D (i), either Assumptions E, U or Assumption EU’, and the
following assumption:
There exist 0 <σ<ρ , functions l and u deﬁned over (c,d] × (0,σ), and an integrable
function k deﬁned over (c,d] such that:
























σ0 are not larger than k(v) over (c,d] × (0,σ).
25Lemma A3-1 below.20
Lemma A3-1: Let either Assumptions E and U or Assumption EU’ be
satisﬁed. Then, for all τ =( τ1,...,τn) in (−ρ,ρ)
nm:
(i) There exists an “essentially” unique Bayesian equilibrium (β1 (.;τ),...,βn (.;τ))
of the ﬁrst-price auction with value distributions F1 = F (.;τ1),...,Fn =
F (.;τn). This equilibrium is pure and there exists c<η<dsuch that the
inverse bid functions α1 = β
−1
1 ,...,αn = β
−1
n exist, are strictly increasing,
and form a solution over (c,η] of the system of diﬀerential equations (A3.1)
below—considered in the domain D = {(b,α1,..,αn) ∈ Rn+1|c,b < αi ≤ d,f o ra l l1 ≤ i ≤ n}—






















,f o ra l l1 ≤ k ≤ n;( A 3 . 1 )
αk (η)=d, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n;( A 3 . 2 )
αi (c)=c, for all but at most one i between 1 and n;( A 3 . 3 )
and βk (v;τ)=OUT,f o ra l lv in [c,αk (c;τ)] and all 1 ≤ k ≤ n.M o r e o v e r ,
d
dbαk (b;τ) > 0,f o ra l l1 ≤ k ≤ n and all b in (c,η].
(ii) For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the functions λji(.;τ)=F (.;τj) ◦ αj (.;τ) ◦
βi (.;τ) ◦ F (.;τi)
−1,w i t h1 ≤ j ≤ n and j 6= i,a n dγi (.;τ)=βi (.;τ) ◦
F (.;τi)
−1 are diﬀerentiable (with respect to the ﬁrst argument) over (F (αi (c;τ);τi),1]
and form a solution of the system (A3.4-3.5)—considered in the domain Di—
20I nL e m m aA 3 - 1( i ) ,b i d d i n gOUT means remaining out of the auction. “Essential”
uniqueness refers to uniqueness for values in (c,d]. The only possible indeterminacy
for an essentially unique equilibrium is at the lowest value c, where some bidders may
choose OUT, c, or randomize between the two. Here, we assume that every bidder k
submits OUT over [c,αk (c;τ)]. All equilibria can be characterized as in Lebrun (1997)
by replacing this assumption by the following condition:
If there exists j such that αj (c;τ) >c ,t h e nβi (c;τ)=OUT, for all i 6= j,a n d
βj (vj;τ)=c, for all vj in (c,αj (c;τ)].





|F (c;τi) <q≤ 1, F (c;τj) <λ ji ≤ 1,
























































,( A 3 . 7 )
where ϕki(.;τ)=αk (.;τ) ◦ βi (.;τ).







for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and v in (c,d].
Proof: The existence of an equilibrium in (i) follows from Theorem 2
in Lebrun (1999) and its characterizati o nf r o mT h e o r e m1i nL e b r u n( 1 9 9 9 ) .
27The uniqueness in (i) under E and U follows from Corollary 1 in Lebrun
(1999). The uniqueness under EU’ follows from Theorem 1 in Lebrun
(2006).
(ii) follows from Lemma A2-5 in Lebrun (1997) or from Lemma A1-1 in
Lebrun (2006). An application, standard in auction theory, of the envelope
theorem gives (iii) ((iii) also follows from Lemma A2-6 in Lebrun 1997). (iv)
follows from Corollary 3 (v) in Lebrun (1999). ||
Although not explicitly proved in Lebrun (1997), Lemma A3-2 below can
easily be derived from the proof of its Lemma A2-3. We provide the proof
for the sake of completeness.
Lemma A3-2: Let either Assumptions E and U or Assumption EU’ be
satisﬁed. Then, for all τ in (−ρ,ρ)























where ϕji(v;τ) is equal to αj (βi (v;τ);τ).













αi (b;τ) − b
−
1
αj (b;τ) − b
.(A3.8)
Let u be in (c,d] and let z>0 such that z<minw∈[u,d]
F(w;τj)
F(w;τi) .
Deﬁne y in [u,d] as follows: y =i n f{w in [u,d]|zF (w;τi) ≥ F (c;τj)},
with the convention d =i n f ∅.S i n c e ϕji(w;τ) ≥ c,f o ra l lw,w eh a v e
zF (w;τi) ≤ F
¡
ϕji(w;τ);τj¢



















v − βi (v;τ)
−
1
ϕji(v;τ) − βi (v;τ)
¾
.(A3.9)
By deﬁnition of z,w eh a v ez<
F(v;τj)
F(v;τi) and thus zF (v;τi) <F(v;τj).C o n -
sequently, ϕji(v;τ) <v .S i n c e d
dv lnzF (v;τi)= d








. From a variant of Lemma








Finally, making z tend towards minw∈[u,d]
F(w;τj)






. The other inequality can be proved similarly. ||
Lemma A3-3: Let either Assumptions E and U or Assumption EU’ be
satisﬁed. Let also Assumptions D (i) and (iii) be satisﬁed. Let η(τ) be
the common maximum of the equilibrium bid functions β1 (.;τ),...,βn (.;τ),
for all τ in (−ρ,ρ)
nm.T h e n , t h e r e e x i s t s K and 0 <ρ 0 <ρsuch that
|η(0)−η(τ)|
|τ| ≤ K, for all τ in (−ρ0,ρ 0)
nm.






















where ϕji(v;τ) is equal to αj (βi (v;τ);τ),f o ra l l1 ≤ i,j ≤ n, τ in
29(−ρ,ρ)




M |τj − τi|
F (v;τi)
¶































≤ F (v;0)+M (|τj| +2|τi|),
where M is an upper bound of ∂
∂τ1F (v;τ),..., ∂
∂τmF (v;τ) over (c,d]×(−ρ00,ρ 00)
m,
for all 1 ≤ i,j ≤ n, τ in (−ρ00,ρ 00)
nm,a n dv in (c,d].






























for all (v;τ) in (c,d]×(−ρ00,ρ 00)
nm. From the mean value theorem, for all v in
(c,d],t h e r ee x i s t sx between F (v;0)and F (v;0)+M (|τj| +2|τi|), such that
F(v;0)n−1−(F(v;0)+M(|τj|+2|τi|))n−1
|τ| is equal to −(n − 1)xn−2 M(|τj|+2|τi|)
|τ| .S i n c e
0 ≤ x ≤ 1+3 ρ00M and 0 ≤
|τj|+2|τi|
|τ| ≤ 3, there exists a ﬁnite K0 such that
the L.H.S. of the ﬁrst inequality in (A3.11) is not smaller than K0. Similarly,
there exists a ﬁnite K00 such that the R.H.S of the second inequality is not
larger than K00,f o ra l lτ in (−ρ00,ρ 00)
nm. The lemma follows. ||
30Lemma A3-4: Let either Assumptions E and U or Assumption EU’ be
satisﬁed. Let also Assumptions D (i) and (iii) be satisﬁed. Then, αi (c;τ)
is continuous with respect to τ at τ = 0.
Proof:F r o m L e m m a A 3 - 3 , η(τ) is a continuous function of τ at τ = 0.
From Lemma A3-1 (i) and from the continuity, under our assumptions, of
the solution of a diﬀerential system with respect to the parameters and to
the value of the solution at the initial condition, we know that for all b in
the interior (c,η(0)) of the deﬁnition domain of α1 (.,0)=... = αn (.,0) and
for all ε>0,t h e r ee x i s t sδ>0 such that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, αi (.,τ) is
deﬁned at b and |αi (b,τ) − αi (b,0)| ≤ ε if |τ| <δ . Consequently, for all b
in (c,η (0)), limsupτ→0 αi (c,τ) ≤ αi (b,0) ≤ b.B y m a k i n g b tend towards
c,w eﬁnd limsupτ→0 αi (c,τ) ≤ c.S i n c e αi (c,τ) is never smaller than c,
we have limτ→0 αi (c,τ)=c and Lemma A3-4 is proved. ||
Lemma A3-5: Let Assumption D (i) be satisﬁed and let F be extended
over (c,d + ζ) × (−ρ,ρ)
m, with ζ>0, as in D (i). Then, there exists
ζ
0 > 0 such that F−1 (q;τ) exists and is (jointly) continuously diﬀerentiable
with respect to (q;τ) over {(q,τ)|τ ∈ (−ρ,ρ)
m ,q∈ (F (c;τ),1+ζ
0)},a n d ,
















Proof:I t s u ﬃces to apply the inverse function theorem to the function
F such that F (v,τ)=( F (v;τ),τ),f o ra l l(v;τ) in (c,d + ζ) × (−ρ,ρ)
m. ||
Lemma A3-6: Let either Assumptions E and U or Assumption EU’
be satisﬁed. Let also Assumptions D (i) and (iii) be satisﬁed and let F
be extended over (c,d + ζ) × (−ρ,ρ)
m, with ζ>0,a si nD( i ) . L e tτ (π)
31be a continuously diﬀerentiable function from (−1,1) to (−ρ,ρ)
nm such that
τ (0) = 0. Then, for all sequence (∆πk)k≥1 of strictly positive numbers
converging towards 0, there exists a subsequence (∆πkt)t≥1 such that, for
all q in an interval (F (c;0),1+ζ
0) with ζ
0 > 0 and all 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n,
limt→+∞
λji(q;0)−λji(q;τ(∆πkt))



































Proof:F o r a l l τ in (−ρ,ρ)
nm,l e tη(τ) be the common maximum of the
equilibrium bid functions. From Lemma A3-3, there exists a subsequence
(∆πkt)t≥1 such that limt→+∞
η(0)−η(τ(∆πkt))
∆πkt exists and is ﬁnite. Let χ be
this limit. For all 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n and q>F (αi (c;0);0),w em a ya s -
sume, from Lemma A3-1 (ii) and Lemma A5-2 in Appendix 5, that λji(q)=
limt→+∞
λji(q;0)−λji(q;τ(∆πkt))
∆πkt and γi (q) = limt→+∞
γi(q;0)−γi(q;τ(∆πkt))
∆πkt exist
and form a solution of the linear diﬀerential system obtained from (A3.4-3.5)
by diﬀerentiating it around its solution λji(.;0),γi (.;0), and of the initial
condition below:
λji(1) = 0,j6= i,(A3.13)
γi (1) = χ.
Diﬀerentiating (A3.4) with respect to π, setting π =0 , using the equalities
τ (0) = 0 and λji(q;0)=q, for all q in the interval (F (c;0),1+ζ
0),w h e r e
ζ
0 is from Lemma A3-5, and rearranging, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients of λhi,















































































Using, for example, the method of “variation of constants,” we easily ﬁnd
that the unique solution of (A3.13) and (A3.14) is (A3.12). ||
Lemma A3-7: Let either Assumptions E and U or Assumption EU’ be
satisﬁe d . L e ta l s oA s s u m p t i o n sD( i )a n d( i i i )b es a t i s ﬁed and let F be
extended over (c,d + ζ) × (−ρ,ρ)
m,w i t hζ>0, as in D (i). Then, for all
1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n and q in an interval (F (c;0),1+ζ
0),w i t hζ
0 > 0, λji(q;τ)
is diﬀerentiable at (q;0) and its partial derivatives are as in Appendix 2.
Proof:L e t τ (π) beacontinuouslydiﬀerentiable function from (−1,1) to
(−ρ,ρ)
nm such that τ (0) = 0.F r o mL e m m aA 3 - 6 ,lim∆π→0
λji(q;0)−λji(q;τ(∆π))
∆π
exists and is equal to λji(q) in (A3.12), for all q in an open interval (F (c;0),1+ζ
0),
where ζ
0 > 0. In fact, otherwise there would exist a sequence (∆πk)k≥1 such
that the diﬀerence ratio would be bounded away from λji(q),w h i c hw o u l d















π=0 exists and is
equal to λji(q) in (A3.12), which is linear in τk
l .
The diﬀerentiability with respect to τ at (q,0) then follows from Lemma
A5-322 in Appendix 5. Finally, the joint diﬀerentiability with respect to
(q,τ) follows from Lemma A5-4 in Appendix 5. The formulas in Appendix
2c o m ef r o m( A 3 . 1 2 ) . ||
Lemma A3-8:
(i) Let either Assumptions E and U or Assumption EU’ be satisﬁed. Let
also Assumptions D (i) and (iii) be satisﬁed and let F be extended over
(c,d + ζ) × (−ρ,ρ)
m,w i t hζ>0,a si nD( i ) . Then, for all 1 ≤ i 6=















and the bid function βi (v;τ) are diﬀerentiable with respect to (v,τ) at (v,0).23
Also, the exante payoﬀ Pi (τ)=
R d
c Pi (v;τ)dFi (v;τi) is diﬀerentiable at
τ = 0. Moreover, the formulas in Appendix 2 for the partial derivatives
apply.














dF (v;τi) and the auctioneer’s
revenues RF (τ) are diﬀerentiable at τ = 0.
Proof:( i ) W e ﬁrst prove the diﬀerentiability of these functions. From
the deﬁnitions, we have ϕji(v;τ)=F−1 (λji(F (v;τi);τ);τj),f o ra l lv>







then follows from Lemmas A3-7, A3-5, and
A3-4.
22Since we obtain the ﬁrst-order eﬀects from diﬀerential equations at the symmetric
case, we need a local condition, such as Lemma A5-3, that is suﬃcient for diﬀerentiability.
We could not apply more familiar global conditions like, for example, the existence and
continuity of the partial derivatives everywhere in a neighborhood of the symmetric case.
23Obviously, Pi (v;τ) and βi (v;τ) are the interim payoﬀ and bid function only for v in
(c,d].
34For all continuously diﬀerentiable function τ (π) from (−1,1) to (−ρ,ρ)
nm
such that τ (0) = 0, the integral in the equality (A3.15) below is diﬀeren-
tiable with respect to π at π =0because (by applying Lebesgue theorem of
dominated convergence, for example) the function inside the integral is dif-
ferentiable with respect to τ at τ = 0 and because, as in the proof of Lemma
A3-3, Assumptions D (i, iii) imply that the ratio





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
|τ| is
bounded:










dw.( A 3 . 1 5 )
Moreover, diﬀerentiation may be taken under the integral sign, and, from the





π=0 is a linear function of d
dπτl
k (0),
1 ≤ l ≤ n,1 ≤ k ≤ m.T h e d i ﬀerentiability of Pi (v;τ) and βi (v;τ) then
follows from Lemma A5-3 in Appendix 5 and Lemma A3-1 (iii).






















(1 − F (v;τi)) − F (v;0)
n−1 (1 − F (v;0))
)
/|τ|












n−1 (F (v;0)− F (v;τi))/|τ|. Assumption D (iii) immediately
implies that the absolute value of the second term is bounded over (c,d] ×
(−ρ00,ρ 00)
nm. Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma A3-3, it also implies that
the absolute value of the ﬁrst term is bounded. As in the previous paragraph,







(1 − F (v;τi)).
35We next prove the formulas in Appendix 2. From the deﬁnition of
ϕji(v;τ),L e m m aA 3 - 5 ,a n d ∂



































Formulas for the partial derivatives of ϕji(v;τ) can then be obtained by




dπλji(F (v;τi (π));τ (π))
¢
π=0.
As we now show, under the assumption that ∂
∂τlF (v;0)is diﬀerentiable
with respect to v, for all 1 ≤ l ≤ m, it is possible to simplify these formu-
las somewhat. Using the equality ∂
∂τlF (F−1 (p;0);0)/f (F−1 (p;0);0) =
∂
∂τl lnF (F−1 (p;0);0) and changing the variable to w = F−1 (p;0), we see

















Integrating by parts and using ∂
∂τl lnF (d;0)=0,w eﬁnd the following equiv-






























Substituting these new expressions in (A3.17), we ﬁn dt h ef o r m u l a sf o rt h e
partial derivatives of ϕji(v;τ) in Appendix 2.
Diﬀerentiating, which, as we proved above, we may do, under the integral
signs in (A3.7), (A3.15), and (A3.16) and using the expressions for the par-
36tial derivatives of ϕji,w eﬁnd the expressions in Appendix 2 for the partial
derivatives of the bid functions and the interim and exante payoﬀs.




Pi (τ) of the bidder’s payoﬀs, which is diﬀerentiable from (i), we
will have proved the diﬀerentiability of the total surplus and RF (τ) once












∂vF (v;τi)dv,f o r
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.L e t τ be a continuously diﬀerentiable function from
(−1,1) to (−min(ρ0,ρ 00),max(ρ0,ρ 00))
nm,w h e r eρ0 and ρ00 are from Assump-
tions D (ii,iii), such that τ (0) = 0.L e t N be an upper bound of the
absolute values of its partial derivatives, so that
|τ(π)|







































From Assumptions D (ii, iii), the absolute value of the function inside the
ﬁrst integral is not larger than the integrable function vNMI (v),w h e r e
M is an upper bound of




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
|τ| ,f o ra l l(v;τ) in (c,d] ×
(−min(ρ0,ρ 00),max(ρ0,ρ 00))
nm,a n dI is the integrable function from As-
















,t h ec o n t i n u i t y
of ∂
∂vF (v;τi), and, for example, the Lebesgue Theorem of dominated con-
vergence. Moreover, from the linearity of the integral, it is equal to a linear
function of d
dπτl
k (0), 1 ≤ l ≤ n,1 ≤ k ≤ m.














. Assumptions D (ii, iii), as in the para-










of the ratio in the deﬁnition






∂vF (v;τi (π))dv is diﬀerentiable at π =0 ,i t sd e r i v a -











and, from the linearity
of the integral, is a linear function of d
dπτl
k (0), 1 ≤ l ≤ n,1 ≤ k ≤ m.T h e
diﬀerentiability of RF (τ) at τ = 0 then follows from Lemma A5-3. The
diﬀerentiability of RS (τ) follows from Proposition 2. The rest of (ii) then
follows from Proposition 1 (Section 2). ||
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 ’ : Theorem 1’ (i) follows from Lemma A3-1 (i).
Lemma A3-8 (ii) and (iii) imply Theorem 1’ (ii) and (iii). ||
Appendix 4
Corollary 1’:
(i) For m =1 , let F (v;τ) satisfy Assumption D and either Assumptions
E and U or Assumption EU’. Let F (v;τ) be strictly increasing in τ for the
conditional stochastic dominance and let ∂2
∂v∂τ lnF (v;0) and ∂2
∂τ∂v lnF (v;0)
exist and be equal, for all v in (c,d]. If the inequality (18) holds true, then
we have ∂
∂τiPi (0) < 0,f o ra l l1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(ii) Let F be a cumulative distribution function that is absolutely con-
tinuous over [c,d] and is diﬀerentiable with a derivative f locally bounded
away from zero over (c,d] and such that (ii.1) or (ii.2) below holds true:
(ii.1) F has an atom at c such that F (c) < n−1
2n−1 and the continuous
extension of f exists and is strictly positive at c;
(ii.2) F is atomless, strictly log-concave over an interval (c,c + ε)
with ε>0,a n ds u c ht h a t(v − c)f (v) tends towards zero as v tends towards
c.
38Then, there exists F (v;τ) that satisﬁes Assumption D and either As-
sumptions E and U or Assumption EU’, is increasing in τ for the conditional
stochastic dominance, and is such that F (v;0) = F (v) and ∂
∂τiPi (0) < 0,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof: From the formulas in Appendix 2, ∂
∂τiPi (0) is equal to the











































dF (v;0).S i n c e t h e l a s t
term is nonnegative, ∂
∂τiPi (0) is not larger than the sum of the ﬁrst three





n−1 (1 − F (v;0)) ∂






















∂τ∂v F (v;0)). Substituting their values to
these terms gives the inequality ∂




n−1 K (v) ∂
∂τ lnF (v;0)dv,
where K is as deﬁn e di n( i ) . T h eﬁrst statement of Corollary 1’ then follows.











(v − c)f (v)=0 . Consequently, limv→c K (v)=1−
2n−1
n−1 F (c) < 0. There thus exists a strictly log-concave continuously diﬀeren-
tiable function ζ (v) (close to zero over (c + δ,d),w h e r eδ is small and strictly
positive) such that ζ (d)=0 , ζ (v) < 0, for all v in [c,d),t h ed e r i v a t i v ed
dvζ (w)
is strictly positive and bounded over [c,d],a n d
R d
c F (v;0)
n−1 K (v)ζ (v)dv <






,w h e r eJ is a strictly positive lower bound
of d
dv lnF (w) (that such a bound exists follows from f (c),F(c) > 0 under
( i i . 1 )a n df r o mt h el o g - c o n c a v i t yo fF over (c,c + ε) under (ii.2)) and L an
upper bound of d
dvζ (w) over [c,d]. ||
Corollary 2’: Same statement as Corollary 2 (Section 4), except that
F (v;τ) may satisfy Assumption EU’ instead of Assumptions E and U.
39Proof: Corollary 2’ is an immediate consequence of the following equal-







































Lemma A5-1: Let (πk,ηk)k≥1 be a sequence in R × Rn converging to-
wards (π,η) a n ds u c ht h a tπk 6= π, for all k ≥ 1.I f limk→+∞
ηk−η
πk−π exists




m≥1 and a continu-
ously diﬀerentiable function e η from (π − 1,π +1 )to Rn,s u c ht h a te η(π)=η
and e η(πkm)=ηkm,f o ra l lm ≥ 1 such that πkm ∈ (π − 1,π +1 ) .
Proof: By considering a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that
(πk)k≥1 is strictly monotonic. Assume, for example, that it is strictly de-
creasing (the proof is similar when it is strictly increasing). We ﬁrst prove
the lemma for (π,η)=0 .L e t χ be equal to limk→+∞
ηk
πk.L e t k1 be a value
of the index such that πk1 ≤ 1 and
¯ ¯ ¯χ −
ηk1
πk1
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ 1. Assume km has been
deﬁned and
¯ ¯ ¯χ −
ηkm
πkm
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ 1/m.T h e n km+1 is a value of the index such that
km+1 >k m,
¯ ¯ ¯χ −
ηkm+1
πkm+1
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ 1/(m +1 ) ,a n d
¯ ¯ ¯χ −
ηkm−ηkm+1
πkm−πkm+1
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ 2/m.T h e
last requirement can be satisﬁed because (πk,ηk)k≥1 tends towards 0 and ¯ ¯ ¯χ −
ηkm
πkm
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ 1/m.
By extracting a subsequence as in the previous paragraph if necessary, we
may assume that (πk,ηk)k≥1 is such that
¯ ¯ ¯χ −
ηk
πk
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ 1/k and
¯ ¯ ¯χ −
ηk−ηk+1
πk−πk+1
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤
402/k,f o ra l lk ≥ 1. Consider a step function σ from (−1,1) to Rn such
that σ(π)=
ηk−ηk+1
πk−πk+1,f o ra l lπ and k such that π ∈ (πk+1,πk).T h e n
approximate σ by a continuous function ζ from (−1,1) to Rn such that
R πk
πk+1 (ζ (π) − σ(π))dπ =0 ,f o ra l lk ≥ 1. Such a function exists. In
fact, it suﬃces to consider a sequence (ζm)m≥1 of functions such that, for









,f o ra l lm>k>1;
¯ ¯ ¯ζm(π) −
ηk−ηk+1
πk−πk+1










k+1,f o ra l lπ and k<msuch that π ∈ [πk+1,πk];
R πk
πk+1 (ζm (π) − σ(π))dπ =0 , for all m>k≥ 1; ζm is odd, that is, ζm (−π)=
ζm(π),f o ra l lπ; ζm+1 is equal to ζm over (πm+1,1). The sequence (ζm)m≥1
is then a Cauchy sequence for the norm of the uniform convergence. As it
can be easily shown, its limit ζ is continuous and satisﬁes our requirements.
A function e η can then be simply deﬁned as follows: e η(π)=η1−
R π1
π ζ (π)dπ.
We have proved the lemma for (π,η)=0 .
In the general case, it suﬃces to obtain the function e η for the sequence
(πk − π,ηk − η)k≥1 and to deﬁne the new function e η(π − π)+η. ||
Lemma A5-2: Consider a system of diﬀerential equations d
dty(t)=
h(t,y,π) and an initial condition y(t1)=η(π) that depend on a parameter π
and that are deﬁn e do v e ra no p e ns u b s e tO of Rn+2,w h e r en is the dimension
of y.A s s u m e t h a t h is a continuous function from O to Rn such that ∂
∂yih,
1 ≤ i ≤ n,a n d ∂
∂πh exist and are continuous over O.L e t (πk)k≥1 be a
sequence in R such that (t1,η(πk),π k)k≥1 is a sequence in O that converges
towards a point (t1,η,π) in O.A s s u m e a l s o t h a t limk→+∞
η(πk)−η
πk−π exists and
is ﬁnite. Let χ be this limit. Let y(.,π) be the solution of the diﬀerential
system with the initial condition as a function of the parameter π.
Then limk→+∞
y(t,πk)−y(t,π)
πk−π exists, for all t in the maximal deﬁnition in-






∂yih(t,y (t,π),π)ρi (t)+ ∂
∂πh(t,y (t,π),π) with
initial condition ρ(t1)=χ.
41Proof: The conclusion of the lemma will be proved if we prove it for all
strictly monotonic subsequence of (πk)k≥1. We may thus assume that (πk)k≥1
is strictly monotonic. Through the change of variables y = η(π)+z, the ini-
tial system and initial condition are equivalent to d
dtz (t)=h(t,η (π)+z,π)
and z (t1)=0 . From Lemma A5-1, there exists a continuously diﬀer-
entiable function e η over a neighborhood of π that coincides with η over
{πk|k ≥ 1}∪{π}. From the equality limk→+∞
η(πk)−η
πk−π = χ,w eh a v e d
dπe η(π)=
χ. The lemma then follows from the application of the standard theorems
of the theory of ordinary diﬀerential equations about the diﬀerentiability of
the solution with respect to a parameter to the system d
dtz (t)=g(t,z,π),
where g(t,z,π)=h(t,e η(π)+z,π), with initial condition z (t1)=0 . ||
Lemma A5-3: Let f b eaf u n c t i o nf r o ma no p e ns e tO of Rn to R
and let ω be an element of O.A s s u m e t h a t f is continuous at ω and
that its partial derivatives ∂
∂τif (ω), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, exist. Assume also that
f ◦ τ is diﬀerentiable at 0 and that d






for all continuously diﬀerentiable function τ (π) from (−1,1) to O such that
τ (0) = ω.T h e n , f is diﬀerentiable at ω.
Proof:S u p p o s e t h a t f is not diﬀerentiable at ω. Then, there exists
 >0 and a sequence
¡
τk¢
k≥1 converging towards ω such that τk 6= ω,f o ra l l

















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
>  ,( A 5 . 1 )
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. By extracting a subsequence, if necessary, we may assume
that
¡¯ ¯τk − ω
¯ ¯¢







bounded, it admits a convergent subsequence. We may thus assume that
this sequence itself is convergent. Let λ be its limit. Since every term of
t h es e q u e n c eh a sau n i tn o r m ,t h i si sa l s ot h ec a s eo ft h el i m i ta n dw eh a v e
|λ| =1 .
A p p l y i n gL e m m aA 5 - 1t o(πk)k≥1 =
¡¯ ¯τk − ω
¯ ¯¢






k≥1,a n dη = ω, we obtain the existence of a continuously diﬀerentiable
function e τ from (−1,1) to Rn such that e τ (0) = ω and e τ
¡¯ ¯τk − ω
¯ ¯¢
= τk,
for all k ≥ 1 such that
¯ ¯τk − ω
¯ ¯ < 1.S i n c e limk→+∞
τk−ω
|τk−ω| = χ,w eh a v e
d
dπe τ (0) = χ. Then, from the assumptions of the lemma, d





∂τif (ω)χi. Consequently, the limit of the L.H.S. of (A5.1),
for k tending towards inﬁnity, exists and is equal to 0. This contradicts
(A5.1) and the lemma is proved. ||
Lemma A5-4: Let f b eaf u n c t i o nf r o ma no p e ns e tO in R×Rn to R
and let (u,ω) be an element of O. Assume that the function f (u,.) from
{τ ∈ Rn|(u,τ) ∈ O} to R is diﬀerentiable at ω and that ∂
∂uf exists in O and
is continuous at (u,ω).T h e n , f is diﬀerentiable at (u,ω).
Proof: We will have proved the lemma if we prove that the limit of the
ratio below for (u,τ) tending towards (u,ω) exists and is equal to 0:
¯ ¯ ¯f (u,τ) − f (u,ω) − ∂




∂τif (u,ω)(τi − ωi)
¯ ¯ ¯
|(u − u,τ − ω)|
.
However, this ratio is not larger than (A5.2) below:
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
|u − u|
|(u − u,τ − ω)|
+








|(u − u,τ − ω)|
.( A 5 . 2 )
Obviously, the two factors |u − u|/|(u − u,τ − ω)| and |τ − ω|/|(u − u,τ − ω)|




where u0 lies strictly between u and u.A s (u,τ) tends towards (u,ω), (u0,τ)
also tends towards (u,ω) and, from the continuity of ∂
∂uf at (u,ω), ∂
∂uf (u0,τ)
tends towards ∂
∂uf (u,ω). Consequently, the ﬁr s tt e r mi n( A 5 . 2 )t e n d st o -
wards 0. From the diﬀerentiability (with respect to τ)o ff (u,.) at ω,t h e
43second term also tends towards 0 and the lemma is proved. ||
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